It is too easy to characterize all terrorists as either affiliated with states or unaffiliated. Reality is murkier than that.
In Laurie Mylroie’s stark conception of international terrorism, the 9/11 attacks could not have been executed without the resources of a state. Furthermore, she says, Iraq worked with Islamic militants throughout the 1990s and sponsored the 9/11 attacks. (*)
We know Dr Mylroie was wrong on a few things. Saddam did not rain anthrax upon Israeli cities when Operation Iraqi Freedom commenced despite her conviction that it would. Peter Bergen concludes she is a “crackpot” in a Washington Monthly essay. (†)
A number of analysts have challenged Mylroie’s position that Saddam’s Iraq sponsored the 9/11 attacks. Mylroie contends that the CIA is withholding evidence of the Saddam regime’s complicity with the attacks. (‡) She wants evidence released of the 707 airplane that was at Salman Pak, a terrorist training camp near Baghdad possibly used to train the 9/11 hijackers. (§)
The main question, however, remains: are non-state entities capable of pulling off terrorist attacks like 9/11? Mylroie could be wrong on a lot of issues, but if she is right that they are incapable of such attacks without state help, she has won a critical point.
It is conceivable that a terrorist group could afford to refuse the help and sponsorship of a nation-state, including funding and protection. Yet, given the choice, a terrorist group would not refuse such aid. That would not be economically rational. The level of aid provided by a state would be too high for a terrorist to pass on.
Perhaps the better question is what incentive if any does a terrorist group have to refuse state aid? In a context of competent and adequate law enforcement closing the net on high–profit margin black market operations like drug smuggling, the level of funds needed to sustain terrorist activity can only come from a handful of a few places, and the most obvious is a government.
Plainly a terrorist network enjoys an advantage over a state in that a state can be easily located by a foreign power and possibly destroyed. A terrorist network thrives on mobility. In the event that a host state like the Taliban suddenly squares off with a superior enemy like the US–led coalition, a group like Al Qaeda has the opportunity to flee the fighting to new environs where operations may safely be resumed, thereby escaping the fate of the host government.
On the other hand, the weak point in the armor of a non-state terrorist network is that for maintenance of group cohesion, frequent resort must be had to global communications technologies like telephones and the Internet. A terrorist network without global communication has no global coordination. In a way, electronic coordination of terror is the most dangerous cyberterrorist threat.
The terrorists’ need for constant global communications access is mitigated somewhat by the method of sleeper cells. If a terrorist group uses sleeper cells, orders can be given in such a way that they are only executed at some point in the remote future. Then, until word comes from above, sleeper terrorists embed themselves deep within the free society. Sleeper cells suffer from numerous tactical disadvantages. People move on with their lives, or miss the secret triggering message. Sleeper cells are highly dangerous weapons when deployed against free states, but a terrorist group cannot rely on them.
To fight a non-state terrorist entity, free states must monitor the Internet and the telephone networks for hidden messages and codes, and put that intelligence to use immediately.
A multi-pronged approach to fighting these terrorist groups may be described as:
- Monitor or cut off the terrorist’s access to global communications networks;
- Reduce the terrorist’s funding by improving law enforcement of black market industries with high profit margins like illegal drugs;
- Reduce the terrorist’s funding by tracking down money laundering schemes and enforcing laws against funding terror;
- By any and all necessary means, disrupt or remove state regimes that sponsor, help, or finance terrorists; and
- Monitor communications and funding links between terrorist groups and regimes.
The last one may prove the most challenging. Unfortunately, I believe that the channel most likely used for communication and funds flow between regimes and terrorist groups is the mosque. The problem might be limited to a few radical mosques. If the problem were indeed limited in scope to a few radical mosques, the level of controversy in addressing this problem would not be high. Controversy, great or small, will inevitably follow scrutiny of mosques, however.
If we take Mylroie’s argument seriously, we have to look at the mosque as the essential middle-man between a government and a radical Islamist terrorist group. We must remember that Islam is a very political religion (and a very religious political system). The mosque traditionally plays a key governance role in Islamic countries.
Today, the known terror-supporting states have dwindled in number. Syria, Iran, and perhaps others continue to support terror. The best strategy for free states is to focus effort on the terror-supporting states and their affiliated groups.