Thoughts on tactics in Iraq.
The Q and O Blog states that the kill ratio for the US in Iraq is about 100 to 1, and he notes that military planners disregard this ratio as for the most part unimportant. (*) This is probably a decent ballpark estimate. I tend to agree with the kill ratio being unimportant. It was taken as a very important statistic in the Vietnam War, but the focus on that number did not help achieve our war aims there.
I have no military training or experience. Please take this with a trainload of salt.
The basic problem we face in Iraq is that we are not achieving our strategic objectives as quickly as we might. In particular, I’m interested here in the goals of locating and destroying terrorist networks in Iraq.
A common complaint against our Iraq war effort is that we have had too few troops. I take a different position here.
Technology makes for one of the US’s decisive battlefield advantages. In essence, battlefield technology is a force multiplier. Smaller numbers of better-equipped troops have the same or greater effectiveness as larger numbers of poorer-equipped troops.
In a battle with equal numbers of troops to a side, and a technological advantage strongly on one of the sides, that side will have the advantage. Technology is so critical that with sufficiently advantageous technology, a low number of troops can defeat a high number of troops.
In modern, fourth-generation warfare, the holder of superior information has a key battlefield advantage. Information is not limited to hi-tech communication networks, however. Information can traverse low-tech networks, including networks of human couriers, and be managed with various wetware methods.
Superior technology does not necessarily result in superior information. Small groups of committed individuals are more likely to learn new information, particularly wetware information, and more likely to be able to react to the new information quickly. This is one reason why a decentralized command structure is often thought superior in 4GW.
The high kill ratio in Iraq may be evidence that US troops are deployed in units of too great a size for maximum effectiveness. Smaller deployments may result in more rapid information gathering and reactions to terrorist groups. Technology should protect the troops, but the kill ratio would likely decrease somewhat. Smaller deployments could achieve strategic objectives sooner, shortening the war, and resulting in an overall lower death rate for US troops.
In summary, the high kill ratio may be evidence that smaller, more autonomous deployments could be a good choice in thie current context. On the other hand, it might not. Perhaps this could be of some assistance to the war effort.
Again, I am far removed from any expertise or actual knowledge.