Uncertainty in the North Korea situation.
There are more questions than answers in the wake of the news of North Korea’s nuclear weapons program. The US slowly gathered evidence on the program since 2000. As a resource-hungry highly enriched uranium program, it would have been impossible to hide it from spy satellites for long. Once the evidence accumulated, the US went to North Korea, accused them of having the program, and thus of having breached the 1994 Agreed Framework. The US expected nothing but denial from North Korea. (*) Instead, North Korea admitted that they had the program.
This was shocking to the US. Perhaps the US had planned to go public with the evidence and spearhead a strong, multilateral effort aimed at forcing North Korea to admit weapons inspectors, just like in Iraq. This would have helped smooth the waters for the desired UN Security Council resolution on Iraq, because the US would be seen as addressing the same threat in Iraq and North Korea, one an Islamic country, the other not. This could have served as proof that the effort against Iraq is not part of any “war of civilizations.”
For whatever reason, North Korea did not deny the existence of their program, and even hinted that they already had nuclear weapons, despite not having carried out a weapons test. Had this information been released by the Bush Administration to the public in early October, it would have changed the character of the debate on Iraq. President Bush would have had to explain to Congress why Iraq is more threatening than North Korea, when North Korea might have nuclear weapons and Iraq does not. As an expansionary power with a serial killer for a leader, Iraq is indeed more threatening than North Korea, but explaining this to the public and to Congress would have been very difficult. Instead of risking a more challenging debate, the Bush Administration withheld the information of North Korea’s admission from Congress and the public. The information was only released hours after President Bush signed the joint resolution authorizing force against Iraq. Congress is annoyed. (†) Unconvincingly, White House officials deny any ill motive. (‡)
Constantly to our detriment, the spirit of partisanship again stalks our foreign policy. By withholding a basic fact from the Iraq debate, President Bush was most concerned with securing partisan advantage. By expending less political capital on the Iraq debate, the theory seems to go, he can expend more on electing Republicans this November. The victim is our foreign policy, which now not only has an occluded moral clarity, but also has been rendered less credible just as the need becomes sharpest for a new Security Council resolution on Iraq.
What direction should US policy now take? We return to the question of why North Korea admitted its nuclear weapons program. If we knew their motive, we could conceptualize a better strategy than otherwise.
We do know that North Korea did not make its admission to prevent Congress from authorizing force against Iraq. Had it wished to, North Korea could have made a public admission any time before Congress voted. We have no reason to believe that North Korea wished to prevent a new Security Council resolution on Iraq. It was American officials who leaked the story to the media.
That leaves other motives. There is speculation that Kim Jong Il wants to be thought of as a “new kind of leader” who doesn’t resort to terrorism or secrecy. (§) Others believe that North Korea has a habit of extracting concessions from the US. With this admission, North Korea plans to get more economic assistance without really dismantling its weapons programs. This appears to provide the animating idea behind Bush’s strategy, as it was recently described. The US would get together with China and Russia, and say to North Korea: you will get rid of your nukes or face a total economic embargo, even from your old friends. (**) This is not a situation just like sanctions against Iraq, however, because of the different threat presented by North Korea. Today, we can still snuff out Iraq’s WMD programs before they become truly threatening to us and the rest of the world, but North Korea is already a nuclear threat to US allies South Korea and Japan, and to the US itself.
The US reaction to North Korea’s admission is still under consideration.
To understand why North Korea made its admission, it’s important to understand that North Korea’s point of view is that the US is the real violator of the Agreed Framework. (††) The US made certain promises pursuant to the Framework. As some analysts have said, the primary responsibility for fulfilling the Agreed Framework falls on the United States. (‡‡)
Yet, Secretary of State Colin Powell has taken a different position. “When the North Koreans told a U.S. envoy of its nuclear program, they ‘blamed us for their actions and then said they considered that agreement nullified. . . . When you have an agreement between two parties, and one says it’s nullified, then it’s hard to see what you do with such an agreement.”’ (§§)
Powell misses the point. The North Koreans apparently said that they considered the agreement nullified because of inaction on the US end of the bargain.
I’m not a lawyer, but here in the US, a “nullified” agreement is permanently dead. If the US were merely behind schedule, the agreement would not necessarily be nullified. Compensation for the delay could make up the difference. That’s a point made on a pro-DPRK bulletin board. (***) If the North Koreans did not truly mean “nullified,” and somehow sent the wrong message, or something was lost in translation, then North Korea might not consider the agreement actually nullified, but merely suspended. I would hope that the US State Department is on top of any such potential miscommunication.
Maybe the DPRK government is in danger of collapse at any moment, and they made the admission in hopes of securing an economic lifeline. If a collapse were to take place, the US would likely send in massive humanitarian aid to the starving populace. (†††)
The official web site of the North Korean government is interesting. (‡‡‡). It portrays a solemn and proud, but obviously very lonely country. There is little sign on the web site that anyone in North Korea is happy. The souvenirs page practically begs visitors to be interested in the stamps and videos. The business information page encourages any business at all to send their brochures and business ideas, as if North Korea were so desperate for investment that anything goes. Yet, no address is left, as if they know few if any would consider writing. The site details the Korean Friendship Association, which is supposed to get the truth out about the real North Korea. In case you were wondering, they are so desperate for people, membership is free. What you don’t see is any suggestion that North Koreans might have any individuality.
My overall impression of the North Korean leadership is that they have a major inferiority complex. The regime’s exact motivation in admitting it nuclear weapons program is as yet unknowable. It is clear, though, that Kim Jong Il wants to preserve the regime in Korea, and to achieve unification with South Korea. He would probably prefer a peaceful resolution over a military one.
One analyst in 1995 detailed a scenario that chillingly parallels that of today.
An American departure from the nuclear accords would evoke immediate loud charges from the north Koreans and prompt them to resume their nuclear activities . If things are left intact as they are now, a full year will have passed on October 21 without any contract being signed with north Korea. A logical conclusion would be that the Americans are not as good as their word, and Kim Jong Il would feel free to order the suspended nuclear activities restarted, including the reprocessing of the spent fuel. This would alarm the Americans into asking the United Nations for a possible sanction against Pyongyang. Imposition of a sanction by the Americans would be viewed as declaration of war on the north Koreans in flagrant violation of the July 27, 1953 Korean armistice agreement. Pyongyang would readily react in full force.
(§§§) Through the fog looms a crisis.
The advantage of diplomacy is flexibility, and that advantage cannot be written off in Korea. (****) A diplomatic solution with North Korea would make it appear not that the US is fighting only Islamic countries, but that the US is fighting only countries that do not make deals with the US and keep their word. There is ample room for a revised deal that would put any North Korean nuclear weapons into cold storage, halt the North Korean nuclear weapons program, and allow the Korean peninsula to hurry along toward peaceful reunification, presumably along democratic lines.