The aspirations of Kim Jong Il.
The 1994 agreement reached by the Clinton Administration with North Korea was intended to prevent Pyongyang from obtaining plutonium nuclear weapons. It succeeded, although by then they might have already had enough plutonium for two bombs. (*) The cost of preventing further production was to provide the regime with some uranium nuclear equipment. Apparently, that provided equipment was not sufficient by itself to create a new nuclear weapon, as some conservatives have charged. This marks the Clinton Administration approach as a partial, but not complete success. Unfortunately, the North Koreans cut a secret deal in the late 1990s with the Pakistanis. It was North Korean missiles for Pakistani highly enriched uranium equipment. The North Koreans got their equipment, and now they hint darkly that they have a uranium bomb, or at least a highly enriched uranium program. (†)
All is not lost. Going by recent actions by the North Koreans, they are eschewing aggression. American officials recently became convinced that North Korea had a uranium weapons program. (‡) They confronted North Korean officials. The North Koreans admitted to having at least a program. It was an admission, not a challenge. They have declared the 1994 agreement “nullified,” but it is not clear that they have accessed the plutonium that they set aside after 1994. North Korea has apologized for some of its aggressive acts in the past. North Korea has recently admitted to the kidnapping of some Japanese citizens between 1978 and 1983 . (§) The Koreas have set up a hotline to defuse military conflict. (**)
What must be done is diplomacy. The goal of the diplomatic efforts should be to reunite the Koreas. If North Korea might be convinced to give up its nuclear weapons before reunification. North Korea is a failing state. It can’t feed its people. It can’t participate in global trade. It is looking at its successful southern cousin wishing to experience its prosperity. More direct cultural interaction between Koreans of the north and south must take place.
The Bush Administration is choosing to forge a coalition, including South Korea, Japan, China, and Russia. (††) The coalition will attempt to pressure North Korea into giving up the nukes. This is a strategy fraught with peril. As with Saddam Hussein, Kim Jong Il may see his nuclear weapons program as the only sure method of preserving his power, and thus may never agree to give them up. What is most needed is a lasting solution to the Korean conflict, a peace treaty to succeed the armistice signed in 1953. This coalition being forged should have the ultimate goals of implementing a peace treaty and reuniting the Koreas. A peace treaty would be a great first step. On the basis of North Korea’s recent spate of peacemaking statements and policies, a peace treaty predicated on eventual reunification should be within reach.
The long-term strategy has got to be a renewed, updated Nonproliferation Treaty. The Bush Administration needs to face the fact that pure unilateralism is not effective in addressing the peculiar threat of nuclear proliferation, as the North Korean–Pakistani deal shows.
October 19th, 2002 at 18:11
Certainly if N. Korea sees that even China and Russia are opposed to their possession of nuclear weapons, they should be more amenable to negotiations.
Re-uniting the Koreas is a great idea, as long as the N. Korean army beats most of its weapons into "Plowshares." Disarming the revolutionaries always seems to be a sticking point in these sorts of negotiations–from northern Ireland to El Salvador to Israel to wherever revolutionaries and reactionaries try to share the same country.